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This paper studies the extent to which decoupled income support measures in agriculture can 
have production implications both at the extensive and intensive margins. We develop a 
theoretical framework that analyzes production responses of agricultural producers to 
apparently decoupled payments, by explicitly considering risk attitudes and uncertainty. We 
use farm-level data collected in Kansas to estimate the model.  Technology and risk 
preference parameters are jointly estimated.  Results show that though lump sum payments 
are not fully decoupled in the presence of risk and uncertainty, their effects on agricultural 
production are likely to be of a very small magnitude.  
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Developed countries tend to provide income support to farmers. Recent years have 
seen significant agricultural reforms worldwide that have often involved a change in 
the way farm incomes are supported (Gardner, 1992; Hennessy, 1998; Rude, 2001). 
While, until recently, support was mainly provided through policies explicitly linked 
to production decisions (i.e., coupled policies), late policy changes have attempted to 
break this link through a process known as decoupling. Decoupling aims to support 
farm incomes, while reducing efficiency losses related to coupled policies such as 
price-support measures or deficiency payments (Chambers, 1995). 
  Not being an exception to this reform trend, U.S. overall farm policy 
underwent substantial alterations in 1996. These changes involved a decoupling of 
U.S. farm policy in that income-support payments were untied from production. With 
the passage of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, price-
supports were reduced in favor of Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments,
1 
not linked to the production of certain crops, actual production, or prices, and a 
deficiency payment program aiming at guaranteeing a minimum support price for 
program crops. Direct payments introduced by the FAIR Act were continued with the 
2002 Farm Bill under the name of Fixed Direct Payments. However, the 2002 Bill 
involved an enlargement in the coupled element of support, as most crop loan rates 
were increased and counter-cyclical payments depending upon market prices 
institutionalized. 
                                                 
1 To receive PFC payments, farmers who had participated in the wheat, feed grains, rice, and upland 
cotton programs in any of the years of the period 1991-95, had to enter a 7-year PFC program (1996-
2002).   
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  The literature that assesses production impacts of policy instruments has 
shown that, in the context of a deterministic world or under the assumption that agents 
are risk neutral, only those policies that distort relative market prices have an impact 
on producers’ decisions. Also, an extensive literature shows that in a world with 
uncertainty, decoupled transfers, by means of altering total farm household wealth, 
can have an effect on economic agents’ risk attitudes and thus on their production 
decisions (see, for some examples, Sandmo, 1971; Just and Zilberman, 1986; Bar-
Shira, Just, and Zilberman, 1997; Hennessy, 1998; or Chavas, 2004). Under the 
assumption that farmers’ are characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion 
preferences, lump sum payments have the effect of reducing farmers’ degree of risk 
aversion. Hennessy (1998) has shown that the willingness to assume more risk may 
result in an increase in production. These “second-order” effects are known as the 
wealth effects of policy. While a change in price supports is likely to exert a 
significant impact on production, it is less clear that producers will strongly react to 
decoupled government transfers. Second-order effects might be expected to be small 
relative to the effects of coupled policies. The existence of these effects and their 
magnitude are issues to essentially be sorted out by empirical analysis. 
  Our paper attempts to investigate the impact of U.S. agricultural policy 
decoupling mandated by the FAIR Act on agricultural production decisions taken 
both at the intensive and extensive margins. We develop a model that assesses the 
impacts of policy instruments by explicitly considering farmers’ risk attitudes and 
uncertainty. A large body of literature exists on the impacts of risk preferences and 
uncertainties on economic agents’ decisions (see, for example, Just and Zilberman, 
1986; Chavas and Holt, 1990; Pope and Just, 1991; Leathers and Quiggin, 1991; or 
Just and Pope, 2002). Empirical studies on this topic have generally estimated  
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technology and risk preference parameters separately, or alternatively, only risk 
preference parameters have been derived (see Pope, 1982; or Bar-Shira, Just, and 
Zilberman, 1997). Joint estimation, which is preferred as it involves gains in the 
efficiency of estimation, has been addressed by a small amount of studies. Most of 
them, however, have imposed restrictive assumptions on producers’ risk preferences 
(see Love and Buccola, 1991). Only a few number of papers have performed joint 
estimation using flexible utility functions that do not impose any restriction on 
producers’ risk attitudes (see Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz, 1994; or Isik and Khanna, 
2003). In this analysis we follow Bar-Shira, Just, and Zilberman (1997) proposal to 
represent producers’ risk attitudes without imposing any restriction on preferences. 
Risk and technology parameters are jointly estimated using farm-level data for a 
sample of Kansas farms observed from 1998 to 2001.  
  Though several empirical studies have assessed the effects of decoupling, 
most of these analyses have assumed risk neutrality (see, for example, Moro and 
Sckokai, 1999; or Guyomard, Baudry and Carpentier, 1996). Hence, our paper 
contributes to the literature on decoupling by providing an empirical application that 
explicitly considers producers’ risk attitudes and uncertainty and by jointly estimating 
technology and utility parameters.  
  Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a theoretical 
model of production under uncertainty and assess non-risk neutral farmers’ responses 
to decoupled government payments. In the empirical application section we specify a 
parametric representation of our model and offer details on the estimation techniques 
applied. Specifics on the data used and the definition of the model variables are also 
presented. We then offer estimation results derived from the analysis of farm-level  
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data obtained from a sample of Kansas farms. Concluding remarks are offered in the 





In this section we develop a conceptual model that investigates the influence of 
decoupling on farm production decisions. We compare production responses to 
changes in decoupled payments with production effects of price variations. Farmers in 
our model have two income sources: market revenues and lump sum government 
transfers. Agricultural policy in developed countries usually involves the use of price-
support measures (such as U.S. deficiency payments). Given the fact that we do not 
have experimental data that allows to compare two situations, one with only coupled 
and the other with exclusively decoupled support, we compare production effects of 
lump sum payments with the effects of prices, representing the latter a coupled 
element of support. A decoupled payment is defined as an income-support payment 
that is exogenously fixed and does not depend on actual production or prices. We 
assume that new producers without production histories are not entitled to the 
payments.  Likewise, new land entering the sector is not eligible for the payments.  
Suppose a single-output firm produces output  y  using a technology that can 
be represented by  () = yf x , where  x is the quantity utilized of a variable input. It is 
assumed that farmers take their decisions with the aim of maximizing the expected 
utility of their wealth. A farm’s total wealth is represented by 
() ω =+ − + Wp f x w x G , where ω stands for a farm’s initial wealth. The market  
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output price is represented by  p and assumed to be a random variable
2 with mean  p 
and variance 
2 σ . The variable input price is represented by w and G  stands for 
decoupled government payments. Producers’ optimization problem can be 
represented by: 
 
[] max ( )
x
EuW =  [] max ( ) ω π +
x
Eu  = ( ) ( ) max ω   +− +   x
Eu p f xw x G  (1) 
 
where  π  represents the profit derived from the farm business. The first-order 






Eu p f w
x
∂
 =− =  ∂
 (2) 
 
where subscripts denote derivatives.  We follow Newbery and Stiglitz (1979) and 
expand  W u  around expected wealth,  ( ) Wp f x w x G ω = +− + . This yields 
( ) WWW W uuu y p p =+ − , where  W u  and  WW u  are the first and second-order derivatives 
                                                 
2 We choose output price as the stochastic variable, because our focus is on policy decoupling 
processes. Policy decoupling usually involves a reduction in price-support measures, which may in turn 
alter price volatility. Output risk will only affect production decisions if variable inputs have an impact 
on output variability. To capture the influence of inputs on output risk we used Just and Pope (1978) 
functional specification. However, results not compatible with economic theory were derived. These 
results may be an indicator that either inputs do not have a strong impact on output risk, or that farmers 
do not consider this issue in their decisions. Hence, we settled with a specification that accounts for 
price uncertainty and assumes output to be deterministic.   
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of the utility function evaluated at the expected wealth (W ). Substituting the Taylor 



















=− . Following Bar-
Shira, Just, and Zilberman (1997), we assume that R is a function of a farm’s 
expected wealth





β η =− = . This specification 
does not impose any restriction on risk behavior. It accommodates risk aversion 
( 0 η > ), risk-neutral ( 0 η = ), or risk-seeking attitudes ( 0 η < ). Further, it does not 
restrict the sign of the wealth elasticity of absolute risk aversion (β ), thus allowing 
for decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) preferences ( 0 β < ), constant absolute 
risk aversion (CARA) attitudes ( 0 β = ), or increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) 
behavior ( 0 β > ). The wealth elasticity of relative risk aversion ( 1 β + ) is not 
restricted either. A value of 01 β >> −  is equivalent to increasing relative risk 
aversion (IRRA),  1 β <−  corresponds to decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA), 
and  1 β =−  represents constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).  
                                                 
3 Our measure of risk aversion based on expected wealth is only an approximation to farmers’ actual 
risk preferences. This measure does not change with different realizations of the random variable 
because it is measured at the expected price, but varies with the level of a farmer’s wealth.   
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The first order condition in (3) shows that the expected utility maximization 
requires the marginal product of an input  x f  valued at the certainty equivalent (CE) of 
price 
2 0
β ησ =− > CE p W y  be equal to the variable input unit price w. 
As noted above, farmers in our model have lump sum payments and market 
revenue as income sources. We choose market prices to represent a form of coupled 
income support, and compare their effects with production responses originated by 
decoupled payments. We assume throughout the comparative statics analysis that 
farmers are decreasingly absolute risk averse ( 0 η >  and  0 β < ) and that the marginal 
productivity of the variable input is positive ( 0 x f > ). The effects of lump sum 




























ε =− >  represents the CE elasticity with respect to 




− = <  is the risk aversion effect of G  
and shows the risk preference adjustment to a change in decoupled transfers.  In 
accord with what has been shown by previous literature (see Hennessy, 1998), 
expression (4) suggests that an increase in decoupled government transfers increases 





































− =<  measures the impacts of a price change on farmers’ risk 
preferences. Expression 
_ CE p ε  shows that an output price variation generates two 
changes that can impact on the level of output. The first effect, the marginal income 
effect ( 0 p > ) represents the marginal income obtained from an increase in output 
prices. The second effect is the risk aversion effect (
2 0
p Rp y σ < ) and measures the 
impact derived from farmers being less risk averse as a result of an increase in output 
prices. Expression (5) is positive, which shows that an increase in output prices will 
also stimulate production.  
  Our comparative statics analysis allows to derive expressions (4) and (5) that 
capture the effects of coupled and decoupled instruments on the level of production. A 
comparison of these two expressions, however, does not allow to draw a clear 
conclusion on their relative magnitudes. This is an issue that needs to be empirically 
determined. It is however expected that prices will have a stronger impact on 
production relative to decoupled payments: while lump sum transfers only impact on 
producers’ behavior through a risk aversion effect, prices influence production by 
means of the marginal income and the risk aversion effects.   
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  The potential of decoupled government transfers to influence farmers’ 
production decisions is not restricted to the intensive margin. These payments are also 
likely to have an effect on the extensive margin. A risk-averse producer will probably 
only stay in the sector if the expected utility of the farm business’ profit is non-
negative  [] () 0 Euπ ≥ . If the utility function is approximated through a second-order 




p Ry πσ − ≥ , where π  is the expected 
profit (see Chavas 2004, p. 48-50). The extensive margin sensitivity to government 
payments is determined in a simulation exercise. The non-negative expected utility 
constraint is checked for different levels of subsidies and the number of farms that are 
likely to stop production under each of these levels is determined. A reduction in 
subsidies will reduce a farm’s profit, but will also increase a farmer’s degree of risk 
aversion. Both changes are likely to trigger the contraction of the extensive margin.  
  This section shows that, though the sign of the effects of decoupling can, to a 
certain extent, be predicted by theory, their magnitude needs to be sorted out by 
empirical analysis. We devote the next two sections to study the impacts of 





In order to be able to econometrically estimate our model, we provide a parametric 
representation. Generalizing the model outlined in the previous section, we define  y  




4 production function  12 yx x
µ γ λ = . Following expression (3) a 
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The system of first-order conditions (6) is jointly estimated with the production 
function by full information maximum likelihood, yielding consistent technology and 
risk preference parameters. The elasticities of output with respect to coupled and 
decoupled policies are constructed based on the generalization of expressions (4) and 
(5) to a two-input model
5 and computed at the sample means. 
 
The dataset 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the influence of government payments on 
production decisions taken by a sample of Kansas farmers. Farm-level data are taken 
from farm account records from the Kansas Farm Management Association database 
for the period 1998-2001.
6 Thus, our period of analysis corresponds to a time during 
which the FAIR Act was effective. FAIR Act payments correspond to our definition 
of fixed payments per farm. Though the analysis is based on individual farm data, 
aggregate data are needed to define several important variables not registered in the 
Kansas dataset. These aggregates are taken from the National Agricultural Statistics 
                                                 
4 Other functional forms such as quadratic or translog were also tried, but yielded inferior results. 
5 Details of this generalization are available from the authors upon request. 
6 Retrospective data for these farms are used to define several lagged variables used in the analysis. To 
be able to do so, a complete panel is built out of our sample.  
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Service (NASS), the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the 
BRIDGE database. NASS provided country-level price indices and state-level output 
prices and quantities. USDA facilitated state-level marketing assistance loan rates 
(LR) and PFC payment rates. From the BRIDGE database we extracted information 
on agricultural commodity futures prices. 
  Using these sources, the variables required to estimate the model are defined. 
Summary statistics for the variables of interest are presented in table 1. Two variable 
inputs are considered;  1 x  includes chemical inputs and  2 x  includes fertilizers. 
Because input prices are not registered in the Kansas database, country-level input 
price indices are taken from NASS. Implicit quantity indices for variable inputs are 
derived through the ratio of input use in currency units to the corresponding price 
index.  
  Following the theoretical model, a single output category is considered as a 
quantity index that includes production of wheat, corn, grain sorghum and soybeans- 
the predominant crops in Kansas. An aggregate output price index is defined as a 
Paasche index that represents farmers’ expected prices. To build the expected price 
index, unit prices for the crops considered are defined as expected prices in the 
following way:  ( ) max , p EC p L R  =  , where  ( ) Cp E , the expected cash price, is 
computed as the futures price adjusted by the basis.
7 The basis is calculated as the five 
preceding years’ average of the difference between the cash price and the futures 
price. The cash price is the state-level output price. The futures price is defined as the 
daily average price during the planting season for the harvest month contract. LR 
                                                 
7 When the futures price is unavailable, the lagged cash price is taken as the proxy for the expected 
price. This only happens for sorghum futures price.  
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represents the state-level assistance loan rate. State-level production is employed to 
derive the aggregate expected Paasche index.  
Kansas database does not register PFC government payments. Instead, a single 
measure including all government payments received by each farm is available. To 
derive an estimate of farm-level PFC payments, the acreage of the program crops 
(base acreage) and the base yield for each crop are approximated using farm-level 
data. The approximation uses the 1986-88 average acreage and yield for each program 
crop and farm. PFC payments per crop are derived by multiplying 0.85 by the base 
acreage, yield and the PFC payment rate. PFC payments per crop are then added to 
get total direct payments per farm.






Our article studies the effects of decoupling on farmers’ production decisions both at 
the intensive and extensive margins. Results of the joint estimation of technology and 
risk preference parameters are presented in table 2. Parameter estimates for the 
production function are all statisitically significant and suggest that production of the 
farms in our sample is characterized by decreasing returns to scale. At the data means, 
0
i x f >  and  0
ii xx f < , which involves that an increase in input “i” use will increase 
output at a decreasing rate. 
                                                 
8 This estimate is compared to actual government payments received by each farm. If estimated PFC 
payments exceed actual payments, the first measure is replaced by the second. This happens to 7% of 
our observations.   
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  The  elasticity of the measure of absolute risk aversion (β ) takes the value of 
-0.39. This measure is statistically different from zero as well as from -1, which 
involves that farmers are decreasingly absolute and increasingly relative risk averse. 
Our results are compatible with the findings of Bar-Shira, Just, and Zilberman (1997) 
who  report  a  wealth  elasticity  of  the coefficient of absolute risk aversion equal  to 
-0.31, or Binswanger (1991) who derived a value of -0.32 for the same measure.  
  Price and payment elasticities of agricultural output are computed at the data 
means and results are offered in table 3. For information purposes, elasticities of input 
consumption are also presented. All elasticities are statistically significant and have 
the expected sign. As expected, 
__ yp yG ε ε > , i.e., coupled instruments have a much 
stronger impact on production than decoupled public transfers. The decoupled 
payment elasticity of output, 
_ 0.006
yG ε = , shows that indeed very large changes in 
these payments are required to generate perceptible effects. These results are 
compatible with Hennessy’s (1998) findings that under DARA preferences, an 
increase in decoupled payments will have a minor effect on variable input use. An 
exercise is conducted to determine the impacts of decoupling on agricultural 
production. A reduction in output price supports is simulated. It is assumed that this 
reduction is fully transmitted to market prices. Lump sum payments are increased to 
exactly compensate the effects of the decline in prices on farms' income. At the data 
means, results show that the average production per farm will be reduced from 
104,315.98 y =  to   ' 93,434.42 y = ,  ' 82,552.87 y = ,  ' 60,789.75 y =  if prices are 
reduced by 5, 10, and 20% respectively. From these results we can conclude that a 
decoupling process that involves a reduction in price supports compensated by an 
increase in lump-sum payments is likely to have the effect of reducing agricultural 
output.   
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  The results of the analysis of the effects of decoupled payments on the 
extensive margin are presented in figure 1. Recall that this analysis involves the 




p Ry πσ −≥  for different levels of decoupled transfers. Results show that if PFC 
payments were cut by half, 2.2% of the risk-averse farmers would probably abandon 
production (see figure 1). The elimination of PFC payments would likely trigger the 
abandonment of almost 6% of the farms.  Thus, once more, results show very small 





This paper studies the extent to which U.S. agricultural policy decoupling mandated 
by the FAIR Act could have had an impact on agricultural production decisions both 
at the intensive and extensive margins. We develop a theoretical model of production 
under uncertainty and assess non-risk neutral farmers’ responses to decoupled 
government payments. Farmers’ risk preferences are represented as a function of 
expected wealth that does not impose any restriction on producers’ risk attitudes. Risk 
preference and technology parameters are jointly estimated.  
  Although several empirical studies have assessed the impacts of decoupling, 
most of these analyses have assumed risk neutrality. Hence, our paper contributes to 
the literature on decoupling by providing an empirical application that explicitly 
accounts for producers’ risk attitudes and uncertainty. 
  Though the theoretical framework allows to predict the sign of the effects of 
decoupling, it does not allow to anticipate their magnitude. We hypothesize that the  
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impacts of lump sum payments on production are likely to be small relative to the 
effects of coupled policies. Farm-level data for a sample of Kansas farms are used to 
estimate the model.  
  Results show that farmers in our sample are decreasingly absolute and 
increasingly relative risk averse. Though decoupled government transfers are found to 
motivate an increase in input use and thus in agricultural output, elasticity values are 
very small, requiring substantial changes in payments to generate perceptible effects 
on production. Conversely, the effects of coupled policies such as price-supports are 
found to be substantially higher. Hence, a decoupling process consisting of a 
reduction in price supports in favor of decoupled government transfers is very likely 
to involve a reduction in both input use and output.  
The impact of lump sum payments on the extensive margin is not found to be 
very relevant either.  Our results show that an elimination of PFC payments could 
trigger the abandonment of only about 6% of the farms in our sample, while a 
reduction in the order of 50% of these payments could involve 2% of the risk averse 
farmers abandoning production. Hence, though PFC payments are not fully decoupled 
in the presence of risk and uncertainty, their effects on agricultural production seem to 
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y (output)  104,315.98 
(120,636.51) 
p (expected price)  0.92 
(0.06) 
1 x  (chemical input)  14,209.34 
(17,177.62) 
1 w  (chemical input price)  0.99 
(0.01) 
2 x  (fertilizer)  18,809.25 
(20,829.04) 
2 w  (fertilizer price)  1.01 
(0.06) 
G  (PFC payments)  11,412.08 
(9,337.62) 
ω (initial wealth)  656,214.29 
(577,944.67) 
Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units  
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λ  6.13** 
(0.06)     
µ   0.44** 
(0.01) 
γ   0.54** 
(0.01) 
η   0.30** 
(0.07) 
β   -0.39** 
(0.02) 
0 :0 H λ µγηβ =====   6.25E8** 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the α = 0.1 level 




Table 3. Elasticity estimates at the data means 
  Elasticity  value 
_ 1 xG ε   0.0064** 
(0.0003) 
_ 2 xG ε   0.0064** 
(0.0003) 
_ 1 x p ε  
2.2899** 
(0.0431) 
_ 2 x p ε  
2.2899** 
(0.0431) 
_ yp ε  
2.1367** 
(0.0438) 
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